"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.-- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

"1. By using force or intimidation;

"2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

"3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Miso

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.

"When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

"1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

"2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities;

"3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children of other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. Nexold

"4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

"5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

"6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.

"7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation."

Republic Act 7659 introduced seven modes of committing rape,38 [Section 11. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.

7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.]
including the twin special qualifying circumstances of the victim’s age and the relationship between the victim and the culprit, which would warrant the automatic imposition of the death penalty. The seven modes of committing rape partake of the nature of a qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code since their presence increases the penalty of rape to one (1) degree.39 [People vs. Flores, G.R. No. 123599, December 13, 1999.] The long-standing rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment, if the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances.40 [People vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 131820, February 29, 2000.] For rape to be qualified as heinous, warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the circumstances of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be both alleged in the information for rape.41 [See People vs. Calayca, 301 SCRA 192 (1999); People vs. Bolatete, supra and People vs. Panique, G.R. No. 125763, October 13, 1999.]

The importance of duly informing the accused of the accusation against him is a constitutional right that cannot be taken lightly, more so if the penalty to be imposed is grave, such as the forfeiture of his life. The essence of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is that "every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information"42 [Balitaan vs. CFI of Batangas, 115 SCRA 729 (1982), p. 739.] so as to "enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."43 [Ibid.]

In setting out the elements of a crime in the information or complaint, the pertinent provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically, Section 9 of Rule 110, provides the following guideline:

"Section 9. Cause of accusation. -- The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce a judgment."

The cited provision is one of the many provisions in the Rules of Court that serves to implement the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him. Relevant to this case is the phrase "a person of common understanding," which has its origin in this jurisdiction in the phrase "a person of ordinary intelligence".44 [People vs. Teves, G.R. No. 128839, July 20, 1999.]

In one case wherein the informations therein alleged:

"[A]nd taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own daughter who is only thirteen years old…"

"[T]aking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his thirteen (13) year old (sic) daughter…"

this Court spared the life of the accused, despite the mention of the age of the victim and the word "daughter" in said informations, on the ground that the quoted informations failed to duly allege the special qualifying circumstances of the victim’s minority and the relationship between the victim and the accused because as phrased, they unduly lay stress on the generic aggravating circumstance of "taking advantage of superior strength".45 [Ibid.] We further explained that:

"Be it in terms of syntax or composition, the wording of the informations is unable to sufficiently notify the accused, a person of common understanding or ordinary intelligence, of the gravity or nature of the crime he had been charged with, especially considering that the generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength is not even an element of the attendant circumstances treated under number 1 of the last paragraph of Article 335. The aforequoted clauses in the informations can thus not be read nor understood as constituting a specific allegation of the special circumstances of relationship of father and daughter and that the daughter was less than 18 years of age at the time the crime of rape was committed."46 [Ibid.]

In People vs. Dimapilis47 [300 SCRA 279 (1998)], the accused escaped the imposition of the death penalty when the information failed to properly allege the actual relationship of the minor victim with the accused. The information stated that the accused was the stepfather of the victim when in reality, the accused was the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother. We stressed that a stepdaughter is a daughter of one’s spouse by a previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses by a former marriage.48 [Ibid., p. 308.] The inaccurate designation in the information of the relationship between the victim and the accused in said case was considered a technical flaw committed by the prosecution that cannot be ignored.49 [Ibid., p. 309.] Furthermore, the incorrect allegation that the accused is the stepfather of the victim when the accused is the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother precludes a finding of qualified rape since the relationship alleged in the information against the accused is different from that actually proven.50 [People vs. Manggasin, 306 SCRA 228 (1999), p. 248.] Similarly, in the more recent case of People vs. Poñado51 [People vs. Poñado, G.R. No. 130334, July 28, 1999.], the information also failed to correctly allege that the accused was the common-law spouse of the victim, instead, the information erroneously alleged that the accused was the stepfather of the victim. On this basis, the accused was not convicted of qualified rape and was merely meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua, this Court thus emphasized that:

"Taking into account the growing number of cases where qualified rape under Section 11 of RA 7659, although proven during trial, could still not be properly penalized because of defects in the Information, We urge the prosecuting fiscals who are charged with the responsibility of preparing Informations to state with particularity the attendant circumstances provided for under Section 11 of RA 7659. More specifically, in qualified rape, both the fact of minority of the victim and the actual relationship between the parties, as worded in RA 7659, must be alleged in the Information. Otherwise, we shall continue to fail both the law and the victims whom the law sought to protect".52 [Ibid.] (Emphasis ours)

Here, to deem that the information against ROSENDO duly alleged the special circumstances of relationship of stepfather and stepdaughter would be to deprive him of his constitutional right to be correctly informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. What the information in this case specifically designated was that the said accused "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of his daughter, VIRGINITA MENDEZ"53 [Rollo, p. 6.] when in truth, the actual relationship of ROSENDO with the victim is that of stepfather and stepdaughter. The fact that VIRGINITA is merely the stepdaughter of ROSENDO was duly proven in the trial and admitted by the parties.

The recent pronouncements of this Court in People vs. Teves54 [Supra.] and People vs. Poñado55 [Supra.] decidedly indicate this Court’s insistence on no less than an accurate description in the information of the inculpatory relationship that would aggravate the offense to one of qualified rape, in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement that an accused should be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.56 [See also People vs. Dimapilis, supra, and People vs. Manggasin, supra.] We therefore cannot sanction the imposition of the death penalty on ROSENDO for raping his stepdaughter when the information fatally failed to designate the actual or correct relationship of ROSENDO and VIRGINITA. The penalty should thus only be for simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

Significantly, accused-appellant in the present petition does not question the trial court’s findings except the penalty imposed upon him for the rape of Carla Jean. Accused-appellant, in his lone assignment of error, contends that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty since the information filed against him did not allege the qualifying circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of a relative within the third degree of consanguinity of the victim.

We find merit in accused-appellant’s contention.

Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1.....When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent or victim.

2.....When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3.....When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

4.....When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

5.....When the offender knows that he is affected with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6.....When committed by any member of the Armed forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any other law enforcement agency.

7.....When by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.

We have already held in the case of People vs. Garcia17 [281 SCRA 463, 486 (1997)] and in other subsequent cases that these seven attendant circumstances under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 are in the nature of special qualifying circumstances which, unlike generic aggravating circumstances which may be appreciated and proved even if not alleged, cannot be considered as such unless so alleged in the information even if proved.

In the case at bar, the attendant aggravating circumstance that the victim was raped in full view of a relative within the third degree of consanguinity was not alleged in the information filed against the accused. Even in the subsequent motion of the prosecution to amend the information against accused-appellant which was filed after arraignment and during trial, and later denied by the trial court, the amendment sought was to clarify that the age of the victim was eleven (11) at the time she was raped and not twelve (12) years old.

Consequently, the qualifying circumstance that Carla was raped in full view of a relative within the third degree of consanguinity cannot be considered against the accused. The reason for this, as enunciated in People vs. Ramos18 [296 SCRA 559 (1998)] is simple. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and the charge against him. Since the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime for which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried, every element of the criminal offense must be alleged in the complaint or information to enable the accused to suitably prepare for his defense.

En Banc, Justice De Leon, People v. Santarin [G.R. No. 133649. August 4, 2000]

As succinctly ratiocinated in the case of People vs. Ramos:26 [People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559, 575-576 citing: Section 14(2), Article III, Constitution and Section 1 (b), Rule 115; Sections 3, 4, 6-14, Rule 110; Rule 116; Rule 117; Sections 3, 4, 5, 11, Rule 120, Rules of Court.]

"While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended by any of the seven new circumstances introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, this Court has referred to such crime as qualified rape in a number of its decisions. However, with or without a name for this kind of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender give a different character to the rape defined in the first part of Article 335. They raise the imposable penalty upon a person accused of rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of death. Such an effect conjointly puts relationship and minority of the offended party into the nature of a special qualifying circumstance.

As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in the complaint against appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. This right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court. Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an information. (underscoring supplied)

xxx.............................xxx .............................xxx

To be more precise, we declared in Garcia that it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned."

En Banc, Justice Purisima, Peoplbe v. Dalafu [G.R. No. 127156. July 31, 2000]  

was committed in full view of the relatives of the victim within the third degree of consanguinity because this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the Information or in the Complaint against the accused.

The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.  Thus, it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information.  The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.[i] People v. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, 24 September 1998, 296 SCRA 17.

In People v. Morena[ii]  G.R. No. 126921, 28 August 1998, 294 SCRA 728.this Court explained that it would be a denial of the accused of his right to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process if he is convicted of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information.  Hence, when the information alleges rape by force and intimidation under par. 1, Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused cannot be convicted of rape under pars. 2 or 3 of the same Article.[iii] In this case, since the accused was charged with rape qualified by minority and relationship under the first attendant circumstance where the death penalty is imposable, he cannot be convicted of rape qualified by the third attendant circumstance of commission of rape within the full view of the relatives of the victim, since this was not alleged in the Information.  

En Banc, Justice Belosillo, People v. Cajara [G.R. No. 122498.  September 27, 2000]

In meting out the supreme penalty of death, the trial court applied Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.  Pertinent portion thereof states that –

x x x       x x x       x x x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1.  When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

x x x       x x x       x x x.

As consistently held by this Court, the seven circumstances (including minority and relationship) added by R.A. 7659 to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, are special qualifying circumstances, the presence of any of which takes the case out of the purview of simple rape and effectively qualifies the crime to one punishable by death.²⁵ People v. Bawang, G.R. No. 131942, October 5, 2000; citing People v. Dominador  Historillo, G.R. No. 130408, June 16, 2000 and People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 (1997).25 Corollary thereto, the Court, in People v. Javier,²⁶ 311 SCRA 122, 141 (1999).26 stressed that in a criminal prosecution especially of cases involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld.  Therefore, to warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in the instant case, the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself.

Applying the foregoing provision and legal precepts in point, the Court is left with no choice but to reduce the penalty of accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua.  While it is true that the age of private complainants were specifically alleged in the information in Criminal Case Nos. 248-96 and 249-96, no birth certificate was presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the age of private complainants.

Thus, in People v. Bawang,²⁷ Supra.; citing People v. Cula, G.R. No. 133146, March 28, 2000.27 the Court said –

x x x However, while the offended party averred that she was fourteen years old at the time, she presented no birth certificate to substantiate the averment.  It has been held -

“At all events, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty.  The record of the case is bereft of any independent evidence, such as the victim’s duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainant’s age.  The fact that accused-appellant Manuel has not denied the allegation in the complaint that Maricel was 16 years old when the crime was committed cannot make up for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden in this regard.  Because of this lapse, as well as the corresponding failure of the trial court to make a categorical finding as to the minority of the victim, we hold that the qualifying circumstance of minority under Republic Act  No. 7659 cannot be appreciated in this case, and accordingly the death penalty cannot be imposed.”

Finally, the qualifying circumstance of relationship as to private complainant, Wennie Merioles in Criminal Case No. 248-96, was similarly not established beyond any scintilla of doubt.  The testimony of accused-appellant that he is married to Nicomedes Francisco, mother of Wennie is not sufficient, considering that accused-appellant also testified that before Nicomedes, he had a “first wife” by the name of Pacita, who now lives in the province.  The doubt could have been easily resolved by the presentation of a marriage certificate.  However, the prosecution failed to so present a marriage certificate to prove the fact of marriage between accused-appellant and Nicomedes Francisco.  Hence, the relationship of accused-appellant to private complainant Wennie Merioles as her step-father, which presupposes a valid marriage²⁸ People v. Brigildo, G.R. No. 124129, January 28, 2000.28 between accused-appellant and private complainant’s mother, was not proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Accordingly, the qualifying circumstance of relationship in Criminal Case No. 248-96 could likewise not raise the penalty of rape to death.

In light of the foregoing, accused-appellant could only be held liable for simple rape, in both cases, and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

Pursuant to Article 100²⁹ Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.29 of the Revised Penal Code, and in line with prevailing jurisprudence,³⁰ People v. Gabriel Flores, G.R. No. 130713, January 20, 2000.30 accused-appellant should be held liable to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto in addition to the P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages awarded by the court a quo.

En Banc, Ynares-Santiago, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GONYETO FRANCISCO y CAPELLAN, accused-appellant [G.R. Nos. 134566-67.  January 22, 2001

The Information charging appellant with rape failed to allege the minority of his daughter-victim. As a result, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to death, consistent with the Court's ruling in People v. Ramos1 [296 SCRA 559, September 25, 1998. See also People v. Medina, GR No. 126575, December 11, 1998, People v. Calayca, GR No. 121212, January 20, 1999; People v. Abella, GR No. 131847, September 22, 1999.] that both the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be clearly alleged in the information. This doctrine is not a "mere technicality"; it rests on the constitutional principle that the accused are entitled "to be informed of the nature and cause" of the accusations against them, as stated in the information to which they are asked to plead prior to trial. In other words, the accused in the present case can be convicted only of the crime alleged in the Information and duly proven during the trial. In sum, he can be held guilty of simple rape only, which was the crime charged in the Information and proven during the trial. 

ccc

In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the father’s parental authority, which the Constitution and the laws recognize, support and enhance, as well as from the children’s duty to obey and observe reverence and respect towards their parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are recognized by law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughter’s will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants.35 [People v. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613, 631 (1992).]

Accused-appellant’s moral ascendancy over complainant was reinforced by the fact that since his wife had gone to Hong Kong to work there, accused-appellant alone exercised parental authority over his children. The overpowering moral influence of accused-appellant as a father took the place of violence and made his carnal knowledge of his daughter rape.36 [People v. Mabunga, 215 SCRA 694 (1992).]

En Banc, Justice Mendoza, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMMANUEL PANIQUE accused-appellant [G.R. No. 125763. October 13, 1999]

The Constitution grants the accused the inviolable right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."25 [§ 1(2), Art. III of the Constitution.] Doctrinally, this means that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information.26 [Balitaan v. CFI of Batangas, 115 SCRA 729, 739, July 30, 1982; cited in People v. Feliciano Ramos, supra; and People v. Medina, supra.] The accused "is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense"27 [Ibid.] charged.

Republic Act 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, imposes the death penalty in the event rape is attended by any one of the "seven new special circumstances" enumerated in the said statute.28 ["Art. 335. x x x.

x x x         x x x         x x x

"1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

"2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

"3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

"4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

"5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease. 

"6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.

"7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation."]

Pursuant to the above-mentioned constitutional right of the accused and the extant jurisprudence on the subject, we have held that the death penalty may be imposed only if the information has alleged and the evidence has proven both the age of the victim and her relationship to the offender. In People v. Perez,29 [296 SCRA 17, September 24, 1998, per Regalado, J.] the Court ruled that because "the circumstance that [the victim] was less than eighteen years of age at the time of the rape was never, in any manner, stated in the Information," the accused could be convicted only of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, not death. We said that it was the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender that would have qualified the rape as heinous and thus justified the imposition of the supreme penalty.30 [People v. Ramos, supra; People v. Medina, supra; People v. Calayca, supra.] 

In the instant case, the age of the victim was not alleged in the Information filed against appellant. Because not all the elements of qualified rape were alleged in the Information, the death sentence cannot be meted out to him.

 En Banc, Justice Panganiban, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINADOR TABION, accused-appellant, [G.R. No. 132715. October 20, 1999]